Why Trump Seeks a Swift End to the Ukraine War
The new National Security Strategy outlines a realist case for pursuing strategic stability with Russia.
The publication of the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) has, predictably, ignited a firestorm through the corridors of power in Kiev and European capitals, while Moscow welcomed it. The document’s stark language, declaring an urgent priority to end the war in Ukraine, has been met with a mixture of outrage and denial from transatlantic elites. What these reactions reveal is a fundamental clash between entrenched transatlantic idealism and a resurgent American realism.
For one thing, the strategy is clear evidence that President Donald Trump’s 28-point peace plan on Ukraine is not an aberration nor is it the product of his special envoy Steve Witkoff being unwittingly manipulated by Russian diplomats—a notion that has spawned absurd theories claiming the plan was “made in Moscow.” It is the logical, hard-nosed implementation of a new strategic doctrine that places American interests first and demands a return to realism in Europe.
For too long, U.S. policy has been driven by a moralistic ideology that subordinates national interest to the unrealizable goal of a total Ukrainian victory. The new NSS represents a decisive break from this approach. It grounds American foreign policy in the unvarnished realities of power, risk, and strategic focus. The implications for the Ukraine war are clear: Washington’s goal is no longer to fuel an indefinite proxy conflict, but to compel a negotiated peace and restore a balance of power that prevents a catastrophic direct clash between nuclear powers.
The 2025 NSS is built on the foundational principle of “America First” for which Trump received a clear democratic mandate. It explicitly states that the United States is no longer “propping up the entire world order like Atlas” and that its rich and capable allies must take primary responsibility for their own regions and defense. This declaration is not rhetorical or philosophical; it is a directive for the entire U.S. foreign policy apparatus.
Applied to Europe, this logic yields several non-negotiable conclusions that directly shape the Ukraine endgame.
First, ending the war is a primary U.S. interest to prevent an unintended, and potentially catastrophic escalation with Russia involving a possible nuclear standoff down the road.
Second, Europe must stand on its own feet, meaning reduced U.S. military presence and aid and a push for greater European self-reliance.
Third, NATO expansion is finished. The strategy aims to end the perception of NATO as a perpetually expanding alliance and also to prevent such expansion in reality. This conclusion is directly linked to the war in Ukraine as Moscow clearly saw Ukraine’s potential membership in a hostile military alliance as a casus belli.
Fourth, strategic stability with Russia must be restored, recognizing the futility and danger of a permanent—and escalating—state of hostility with a nuclear-armed great power.
These are not isolated points but parts of an integrated framework. The strategy criticizes European officials for harboring “unrealistic expectations” about the war, noting that while a significant majority of Europeans want peace, their desires are not reflected in official policy. In short, Washington is now committed to imposing strategic reality on allies whom it sees as having lost touch with it.
Within this strategic context, Trump’s 28-point peace framework is revealed for what it truly is: a pragmatic tool of American statecraft. When your overriding goal is to end a war swiftly, diplomacy inevitably focuses pressure on the party over which you have the most leverage. Not only does Russia hold the military initiative on the ground, but the U.S. has few remaining non-escalatory tools to pressure Moscow. Conversely, Washington possesses immense and direct leverage over Kiev.
Therefore, a strategy aimed at a rapid conclusion logically leads to pressing Ukraine for concessions. The elements of the Trump plan—territorial adjustments, a formal bar on NATO membership for Kiev, restrictions on the Ukrainian military, and a prohibition on seizing Moscow’s sovereign assets—are not a Russian “wish list” but calculated compromises designed to create a deal the Kremlin might accept. They align perfectly with the NSS objectives of halting NATO expansion and de-escalating tensions with Russia. The administration’s resolve on these points is evident, as officials have signaled an intent to press ahead on key provisions despite European and Ukrainian protests.
Furthermore, the strategy’s emphasis on avoiding long-term entanglements makes it highly unlikely the U.S. will offer Kiev robust security guarantees that could chain America to a future conflict. The goal is to extricate the U.S. from the crisis, not to assume a new, open-ended commitment.
The path charted by the NSS will not be smooth. A powerful, bipartisan faction of the Washington establishment—including figures from the former Trump administration like Mike Pompeo—remains committed to sabotaging any peace deal, branding realism as appeasement. These war hawks, some with troubling financial ties to the defense industry, are conducting a rearguard action through media leaks and political pressure.
However, the publication of the new NSS alters this political battlefield. It is the foundational document that guides the executive branch. Career officials at the State Department and in embassies worldwide are now duty-bound to align their actions with its goals, regardless of personal views. With a Republican president and a Republican-controlled Congress, the administration possesses significant political capital to execute this vision, at least in the near term.
The ultimate question is whether Moscow will find the terms on offer sufficient. The Kremlin has indicated disagreements with some points. Yet the new U.S. strategy demonstrates a sober understanding of power dynamics: Russia’s battlefield position grants it negotiating strength. If the initial offer proves insufficient, the logic of the NSS suggests Washington may be prepared to increase pressure on Kiev and Europe, or offer further assurances to Moscow, to achieve its paramount objective of ending the war.
The onus, however, is also on Russian President Vladimir Putin not to overplay his hand. The strategy represents a rare window of opportunity for Moscow; seizing it would require foresight to move toward a stable, if wary, relationship with the United States.
The era of America underwriting Europe’s security fantasies is over. The new National Security Strategy demands a peace in Ukraine that serves American interests—prioritizing stability over maximalist justice, de-escalation over moral posturing, and the hard work of diplomacy over the seductive folly of endless war. It is a difficult but necessary correction, one that offers the only plausible path to saving what remains of Ukrainian sovereignty while averting a far wider, and potentially civilization-ending, disaster.
The post Why Trump Seeks a Swift End to the Ukraine War appeared first on The American Conservative.
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