To paraphrase a viral retort from 2023: What did you think ending the Ukraine war meant? Vibes? Speeches? Essays?
At some point you need an actual deal.
What has been lost in the noise surrounding the Trump administration’s proposed peace plan is the recognition that the bargain at hand accomplishes the primary objective: It ends the war. Moreover, it preserves a sovereign Ukrainian state and establishes a U.S.-backed security guarantee reflecting the strongest commitment Kiev might expect to receive from the West. The proposal delivers a generous reconstruction package, serious investment in critical Ukrainian infrastructure, and key stabilization mechanisms governing nuclear safety and food exports.
These are real, tangible achievements. And yet we need not pretend that this is a perfectly balanced settlement. The terms favor the side that is and has been winning the war. To be clear, it neutralizes Ukraine’s NATO ambitions, locks in territorial gains for Russia, and reintegrates Moscow into something resembling the polite society of Western powers through sanctions relief, economic partnership, and an invitation to rejoin the G8.
But why this deal? And why now?
Much will be made about Trump’s impatience with Volodymyr Zelensky or affection for Vladimir Putin. Already, allegations have emerged that sections of the proposal have been translated directly from Russian demands. But the fact remains that time is not on Ukraine’s side. Wars of maneuver reward the side with agility and morale. Wars of attrition favor the combatant boasting better manpower and industrial output. Over the past three years, the battlefield has shifted decisively toward Russia. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s demography has been decimated. Its energy grid is shattered, Western stockpiles have shrunk, and foreign funding has dried up. The latest corruption scandal in Kiev only compounds the problem. That members of President Zelensky’s inner circle are now implicated in the largest corruption investigation since the war began—allegedly laundering more than $100 million from the state-owned nuclear power company amid rolling blackouts—is certain to weaken Kiev’s bargaining position with allies and adversaries alike.
To demand a better deal is to assert improved leverage which, in turn, requires better battlefield prospects. If Washington or Brussels wanted materially better terms, Ukraine would require some combination of additional manpower, more shells, a defensive air umbrella, or a willingness on the part of NATO to directly escalate against Russia. Considered in that order, these aims are either impossible, infeasible, unimaginable, or absurd.
Ukraine cannot mobilize additional recruits because its population is exhausted. Western lines of ammunition production are stretched. A defensive air umbrella would require NATO forces to enter the conflict directly and such escalation carries the very real risk of nuclear confrontation with Russia.
In an alternate timeline, perhaps a better peace was possible. Think back to 2022. Ukraine had secured victories around Kiev, Kharkiv, and Kherson. With Russia on its heels, Zelensky might have negotiated from a position of relative strength. The Istanbul framework, established that spring, envisioned neutrality but traded nonalignment for a full Russian withdrawal to pre-invasion lines and a process to address Crimea.
Policy—especially of the sort that determines the high politics of war and peace—often involves selecting the least bad option at a moment of opportunity. Late 2022 presented such a moment. Instead, leaders in Washington and London could taste victory. Expectations swelled in Kiev. The good guys were on the march.
But since Ukraine’s failed offensive of 2023, the war has progressed in the other direction.
The hotly anticipated push toward Melitopol and Tokmak demonstrated the basic and unfavorable structural conditions of the war. Ukraine sustained severe losses while Russia’s layered defenses held. Western armor could not break through fixed lines without air superiority. Ammunition shortages crippled operational tempo while manpower scarcities bled Ukrainian armed forces dangerously thin. Speeches, sanctions packages, and expressions of solidarity have yet to reverse this reality.
None of this is meant as a criticism of the Ukrainian people, who have fought gallantly and endured barbarity.
But from the perspective of the Trump administration, or any policymaker willing to put America first, the national interest cannot be ignored. The past three years of war have depleted U.S. ammunition and air defense stockpiles faster than our defense industrial base could replace them.
Beyond these material shortfalls, the war has also dominated strategic attention and political deliberation to the detriment of other pressing matters. The termination of hostilities would allow Washington to begin setting its own priorities rather than reflexively responding to crises on the outer edges of the European security perimeter. For an administration elected in part on its promise to reduce foreign entanglements and restore focus at home, closing out the largest land war in Europe since 1945 is an important imperative.
As such, realism provides clarity. A settlement secured after three years of attrition will not resemble the deal Ukraine might have had when it held the initiative. But the question confronting us now is not whether the agreement is perfect. Rather, are the alternatives worse? Keep fighting? Toward what end? To endure more casualties, greater destruction, and dwindling American support in hope that a weaker position will yield a better deal at some later date?
Nor should ending the war be confused with rewarding Moscow. To the contrary, Russia will emerge from the carnage having absorbed catastrophic casualties, a battered economy, and a severely degraded international standing. Ukraine, for its part, and despite the bruising it has taken, will arise stronger, better armed, and more fully integrated into the West economically. A more stable and sustainable future awaits.
In the meanwhile, war rarely rewards wishful thinking. The window for the better deal came and went. What remains is the difficult choice between an imperfect peace and a failing war. Ending hostilities now is the only path to avoiding something worse.
The post Trump’s Ukraine Proposal Is the Least Bad Option appeared first on The American Conservative.
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