Life After Xi
China is sailing the high seas with an aging helmsman.
For years, Xi Jinping has encouraged the usage of many Maoist era slogans. One such slogan, “Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman,” was a Cultural Revolution staple, used in song, speeches, and on posters praising the chairman. The slogan’s reemergence highlights a connection in how the state viewed itself then and now.
The slogan also reflects Xi’s view of himself. As his years in office have gone on, this self-portrait has also been imposed on the party itself. Xi is presented as singular and irreplaceable. And yet, inevitably, he will need one day to be replaced.
Already seventy-two years old, Xi likely will secure another five-year term in 2027. But time is an enemy not so easily purged. As the years go on, the passage of time will silently erode Xi’s authority and reshape the behavior of other Chinese elites, loosening his hold over them, whether or not the aging leader is ready for it.
Xi’s China pretends succession is a solved problem. It is not. The CCP chooses to ignore the question publicly, but behind closed doors, the party cadres know the clock is ticking.
In the West, Xi’s consolidation of authority is often portrayed as growing in strength. In reality, it reflects myriad forms of national weakness: factionalism, corruption, economic slowdown, demographic collapse. Each is pushing China from a bureaucratic technocracy back into a personalist autocracy.
This transition is well documented by scholars. Carl Minzner, one of the leading voices on China’s political trajectory, argues that China is experiencing an era of “counter-reform” in which personalism resurfaces as institutional norms grow weak.
Xi’s power was not inherited. His predecessor, Hu Jintao, did not wield anything close to this level of authority. Rather, Xi spent a decade systematically building a network designed to center the system around himself.
Although the Chinese Communist Party frames this centralization of power as necessary for “stability,” it risks a succession crisis in the not-too-distant future. When China reaches the time when a power transition is needed, it will enter one of the most dangerous political periods since Mao. But the Chinese political class is likely to maintain control.
As rulers age in personalist structures, the incentive structure of elites shifts. While supporting the aging ruler is safe now, that calculation will change in five or ten years. As the helmsman weakens, elite-risk calculation shifts against the aging captain, regardless of ideology.
Strongman autocracies always insist that their helmsman is timeless. Mao was celebrated for his vigor even at eighty-two when he was clearly geriatric. The same was true for the energetic Soviet gerontocrats like Brezhnev, even as he slept through Politburo meetings. Of course, American readers may feel a sense of déjà vu, as recent presidents and congressional leaders have often been older than Xi himself. But one way or another, U.S. elections tend to remove even the most ingrained figures and provide a mechanism for selecting their replacement.
Xi, in his speeches, portrays himself as a visionary leading China into a “new era” of “national rejuvenation.” In his 2021 New Year’s address, he spoke again of “changes unseen in a century.”
However, while his propaganda can deny reality, those in his political orbit cannot.
A rising administrator wonders what value there is in tying his future to a man nearing eighty. Businesses will worry about investment under instability. Technocrats worry about imposing new reforms that curb the old man’s power, something anyone who has ever spoken to their grandfather could understand.
Xi’s administration is often credited with the elimination of factional politics. However, this is a mistake. Instead, the reality is that China’s political factionalism moved underground.
Minzner notes that institutional decay strengthens informal political networks. Jude Blanchette describes a similar process in his work on how Xi re-engineered the political system around himself.
The calculus for the cadres in these factions is not to openly oppose Xi. He has won for now. Instead, they wait. They prepare for the world after Xi. They hedge their bets quietly, judging rationally that this is the correct next step in a system under an aging apex.
As with past power transitions, even in the wake of instability, it is unlikely China will experience a dramatic revision. The CCP has always preferred slow rebalancing. The likeliest scenario has four main themes to watch for:
1. A Temporary Leadership Committee
In the initial stages after the resignation of the leader, Leninist systems often turn to rule by committee. Without an obvious successor, they let the committee essentially act as a political testing ground. Eventually, one dominant personality will likely rise through the committee to define the new era.
2. A Weak Successor
In spite of the ascension of a new leader, it is very unlikely such a figure could match the gravitas of Xi. Even if he is a loyalist with Xi’s backing, he will lack the prestige and centrality of his predecessor.
3. Policy Moderation is Different from Westernization
Xi’s regime has often been seen as a reversion to the old ways. Moving away from this policy will likely be misread in the West as liberalization. Instead, CCP elites will make such moves in order to buy stability. It is likely China will return closer to the technocratic model of Xi’s predecessors, in spite of the current administration’s purges of past technocratic leaders. This means pursuing quieter diplomacy and selective deregulations.
4. Military’s Political Power Increases
Xi significantly strengthened the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). With his resignation, its power will remain, and it will be less restricted by the new leadership. This doesn’t mean a military takeover, but the power of the PLA will be elevated in the new China.
After Mao’s death, China spent thirty years working to build a political system that, while authoritarian, was designed to prevent dictatorial rule. Chinese elites put into place retirement ages, term limits, and other restrictions on presidential power as tools of self-preservation. Xi dismantled these structures, ensuring his continued place at the helm. But sooner or later, the ship of state must confront the brutal waves of reality.
The post Life After Xi appeared first on The American Conservative.
Google Search
