Conor Boyle is a young conservative and unionist from Northern Ireland, an Oxford graduate, and now works in the financial services sector.

Civil service reform used to be a topic reserved for genuine political anoraks, and A-Level politics teachers, but if we want the country to succeed, it’s going to have to become an issue on all our lips.

The permanent system of government in the United Kingdom is often heralded as a model of good administration.

We’re told that the British model is the ‘Rolls Royce” Civil Service, capable of governing a vast global Empire and achieving some heroic feats. This is all very much in the past. And the issues with today’s civil service are the major roadblocks to a building a more successful, prosperous, efficient Britain. The are, to my mind, two serious problems. The first is the mentality and culture of our bureaucracy, and the second is the inability to do anything about it.

On the civil service themselves, without being impolite to our public servants, but I highly doubt many of the current crop would have made it in the days when Wellington or Disraeli were running the British Government. I have heard commentators from Tony Young to Dominic Cummings lay the decline in calibre of our public servants at the feet of the push to remove the aristocracy (who they argue felt a mitral burden of duty and service to the country) in favour of a merit-based system unveiled after the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms.

I’m not sure how much there is to this theory, I don’t propose to explore it further. My initial gripe is that, at the moment, we don’t have a meritocratic civil service, and culture turns away good, able, energetic young people before they reach senior positions. This is undoubtedly true. Seventy years ago, let’s say, the top graduates of our great universities would bite your hand off for a job in the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, and many more government departments and agencies alike.

While may talented youngsters are, of course, still applying to become diplomats and what-not, it is no longer the case that the civil service attracts talent on a scale even close to the private sector. Consider that, a century ago, the type of young person being recruited for the likes of Stripe or SpaceX, seen a career in the Home Civil Service as having a greater level attractiveness to a private venture.

Now, it’s not even close.

Never-mind the super and futuristic companies mentioned above, the Civil Service can’t even compete with the relatively run-of-the-mill private sector jobs in London and the South-east. Part of this is money, of course (although, not if you subscribe to the argument about aristocrats and their love of service) but it’s also something deeper; the feeling that you’ll achieve something, be part of something special or important in a fast-paced private sector role; whereas in the civil service there is a perception – borne out by reality these days – that your job would be to push the pen and watch a managed decline.

Now, there will be a sort-of chicken and egg argument here about which caused which. Did the civil service stop attracting the best and brightest because Britain is no longer a great power, or did we stop being a great power because the talent intake dried up. The answer to that question I do not have, but I’m not sure that’s even the most important point.

The point is that the current civil service cannot hold a candle to its former self, and the country is suffering as a result. Readers who are alive in modern Britain will not need a reminder of this. Infrastructure projects don’t get built, or when they do, they’re very late and more costly than ‘anticipated’, the government can’t manage large data sets without losing some of it, there’s no joined-up or long-term thinking when it comes to procurement, the services provided are inefficient and the negotiating skill leaves a lot to be desired.

The reason for all of this, in my view, is the lack of a proper incentive structure. On the one hand, it appears nearly impossible to be dismissed from the civil service for not being very good, and there appears to be no consequences for catastrophic failure. On the other, there is neither the political will nor the public appetite to provide large rewards for a job done really well.

It seems to be an unfortunate truth that civil servants can fail upwards.

Doing the job, having held the very eminent position, is an achievement in itself. It’s the sort of London dinner party mentality that says, “ooh what an impressive title he’s got”. Despite the fact that the public have been broadly unimpressed by the performance of the NHS for the last ten or fifteen years, all permanent secretaries in the Department of Health leave with not only their generous pension package, but with a knighthood.

The gong, which ought to be awarded for having done something good, worthwhile or impressive, is merely a perk of the job, regardless of how well or badly the job is actually done. This is surely bizarre.

The other big problem is the political impossibility of changing any of this.

Any notion of substantial reform to the civil service is met with the howls of derision, and firm clutching of pearls.

The high-pitched screeches of “politicization” can be heard from all directions. To me, this is a sort of luxury belief that merely exists to ensure that entrenched interests aren’t disrupted by the will of the voters if they prove too radical. Just a few years ago I might’ve called that view a conspiracy theory, but I believe it’s as clear as day now. In the early twentieth century, a Labour government would’ve complained that the Whitehall mandarin was obstructing their programme, and the civil service was broadly a soft-Tory institution.

Today, the civil service would probably be described accurately as socially liberal, fairly internationalist/multilateralist and somewhat Keynesian in their economic philosophy. Obviously, this is painting with a broad brush, and I want to avoid the claim often made some on the right that the civil service is rabidly left wing or anything of the sort. I don’t think there’s much malign intent here, just a relatively common “do-gooder” attitude to the politics. There’s nothing wrong with that, it’s a perfectly legislate world view.

The problem is that it stays constant in the heart of the British government even as the voters opt for a different direction of government from election to election. It is bizarre to me that “politicized” carries such weight as an insult, surely we want the officials implementing government policies to be invested in the policies’ success.

As such, I would be in favour of a new system which allowed ministers to appoint senior civil servants to oversee the implementation of the Government’s programme, including Permanent Secretaries. Minister should have trusted advisers who also believe in the mission they are carrying out. I believe there are lots of benefits that would come from this.

Firstly, I think the quality of our public discourse would be enhanced markedly because think tanks would be empowered and become a much more important institution in British politics. This is because, when a party is in opposition, the would-be political appointees in the civil service will not be employed by the state and so would take up roles in think tanked which are broadly aligned to their political masters’ tastes.

For instance, young, smart thinkers on the right would spend these years in the likes of the Institute for Economic Affairs, Adam Smith Institute, or the Centre for Policy Studies, building up the knowledge and intricate detail of policy and implementation. As the think tanks grow stronger with high calibre, passionate, intakes, their production of research, papers, memos will be strengthened. As such, on both sides, our politicians will be well-armed with the facts, arguments and intuition for all of the policy ideas that are floating around our political system.

Secondly, the state will be better run with outsiders and true believers being responsible for policy. Under this type of regime, civil servants could properly be held to account in front of Parliament, because the old rules would no longer apply. This means that those responsible for projects that go wrong can be dismissed forthwith. Most importantly, ministers will, for the first time in decades, be in control of their departments. Currently, as I see it, a Minister of the Crown is a glorified press secretary for their department who answers to the press and on the floor of the House of Commons. The tortured metaphor of “pulling the lever but nothing working” would be consigned to the dustbin of history, because ministers would be directing officials who are loyal to the Government’s policy programme. The institutional power base of the Civil Service, which is considerable to say the least, will be significantly weakened by the ability of a minister to appoint trusted confidants to positions within the command structure of a department.

It is always the political moderates in our society today – the Lib Dems, Tory wets and the New Labour crowd – who are most appalled by this idea. It’s the sort of people (and their voters) who stand to lose most from a government with a radical vision (in any ideological direction). Thus, the compliant about “politicizing” the civil service is one they make rather disingenuously. Currently, I would argue that the administrative state is akin to a Blairite think tank. The political bias of the current system suits them nicely. It’s not that they’re trying to protect a truly neutral system. What I’m proposing is to simply make the political bias more open and honest, so that no one is under any illusions or pretences.

It goes without saying that this more radical reform can only come after getting the basics right. Restore appointment and promotion based on ability alone, removing any quotas or requirement on the basis of immutable characteristics, looking beyond university graduates alone for top jobs, end promotion and pay policy based on seniority or length of service in favour of a performance-based system, and begin the long-overdue process of downsizing much of the Civil Service to reduce overmanning.

This is necessary, so that decisions taken by Governments are implemented without needless layers of bureaucracy and second-guessing by well-meaning officials. And when the policy is delivered, its success or failure can be judged, and decision-makers held to account. This is good for democracy. This is good for Britain.

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