Congress Clings to Cold War Framework for U.S. in Europe
The new National Defense Authorization Act handcuffs the president to an antiquated European defense posture.
Congress has inserted a provision into the annual defense funding bill, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), that would prevent President Donald Trump from shifting the defense burdens in Europe. Both chambers passed similar but not identical provisions, leaving the possibility for dissenting members to advocate for stripping the provision from the final bill or to offer significant amendments if given the chance. What is most striking is the willingness of Republican national security leadership in both chambers to handcuff the president in exchange for keeping the United States as the main bill-payer for European security.
The Senate’s language would restrict the President’s ability to draw down forces in Europe below 76,000 and prevent him from divesting legacy bases in the region or relinquishing the U.S. hold on the Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) post within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) unless the secretary of defense complies with an onerous and arguably impossible certification requirement. The House language largely sets the same restrictions, but requires both the secretary of defense and the commander of U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) to make independent certifications. The House bill, notably, does not extend the restrictions on presidential decision-making to the SACEUR position.
These provisions extend far beyond a reasonable standard for routine oversight. Congress is trying to make American foreign policy itself because its members don’t want to shift defense burdens in Europe. The requirements set forth in both provisions unnecessarily force division and strife between civilian and military leadership. For example, the Senate bill calls for the USEUCOM commander and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide separate and additional “independent” assessments of how a reduction in force posture would impact U.S. security and the capabilities of NATO allies. Additionally, a similar separate “independent” assessment is called for regarding the impact of a decision to relinquish the U.S. hold on the SACEUR position. The House bill goes a step further by requiring certifications from both the secretary of defense and the USEUCOM commander, breaking the chain of command by placing the USEUCOM commander’s perspective on equal footing with that of the secretary of defense.
Members of the Armed Services Committees on both sides of the aisle have been vocal advocates for civilian control of the military. Yet elevating assessments conducted and informed only by uniformed military leadership as a check on the decisions of the commander-in-chief is incompatible with that core principle. Furthermore, the combatant commands and the Joint Chiefs of Staff already provide input alongside civilian leadership on products going before the secretary as standard practice. A separate, “independent” product from senior military leadership is not only duplicative but also breaks down a civilian-led, cohesive coordination process.
Both chambers also required the Department of War to provide NATO allies and partners the ability to weigh in before the president moves forward with what should be national, sovereign decisions. As currently written, any move to reduce forces and basing in USEUCOM below prescribed levels, or relinquish the SACEUR position held by the U.S. in NATO, can be undertaken “only after appropriate consultations with all North Atlantic Treaty organization allies and relevant non-NATO partners” (emphasis added) have been completed as part of the certification.
The standard is designed as a poison pill to prevent burden-shifting in Europe. NATO allies and partners have no incentive to willingly bless a move that leaves room for the U.S. to step back as security guarantor for the continent. But truly abhorrent is the cynicism of American policymakers who put the interests of NATO allies and partners on equal footing in the president’s ability to allocate America’s scarce national defense resources. Allied status is not equal to, nor should it ever supersede, the authority of the U.S. commander-in-chief. Despite these usurpations of authority designed to constrain the President’s vision for a burden shift in Europe, the provision has received little coverage in the press and no opportunity for thorough debate by the full membership of either the House or Senate. The Trump administration, to their credit, included vocal opposition to both provisions in official Statements of Administration Policy on the House and Senate NDAAs earlier this year. But as House and Senate leadership scramble to finalize the NDAA behind closed doors before year’s end, Congress owes the American people a debate. The Armed Services Committees’ effort to prevent a shift of the burden of European defense to European nations capable of resourcing their security needs should come under public scrutiny. With a debt-to-GDP ratio well over 100 percent and an annual deficit of $2 trillion per year, Congress needs to come to grips with scarcity.
The post Congress Clings to Cold War Framework for U.S. in Europe appeared first on The American Conservative.
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