The United States should consider the creation of a ‘Gaza Canal’ between the Mediterranean Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Such a project could have myriad benefits, including:

• alleviate maritime traffic congestion and decrease shipping times between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea;
• lower regional transit costs due to direct competition with the Suez Canal;
• spur growth in southern Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia;
• improve Israeli-Arab relations; and
• provide a strategic alternative to the Suez Canal if it were compromised during potential great power conflict or terrorist attack.

Furthermore, due to the benefits to be incurred by Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, the five countries involved could jointly fund and develop the project to expedite development and lower the cost to taxpayers—a cost which would already be mitigated by the potential return on investment from canal profits collected in U.S.-controlled Gaza, and southern Israel.

The Gaza Canal

A potential route for the Gaza Canal could follow Israel’s shelved plan for the Ben Gurion Canal. This project was drawn up in the 1960’s to create an alternative to the Suez. The original conversations even included American proposals to use nuclear weapons to carve the canal. However, with Gaza on the drawing board, a more direct route is possible.

A straight route from Gaza to the Gulf of Aqaba would stretch close to 130 miles through the Negev Desert, just 10 miles longer than Suez but would need to cut through some elevated territory. A route like that of the original Ben Gurion Canal could trace a route between mountainous terrain and empty through the Arabah Valley. This option would be longer, at around 160 miles, but still a good deal shorter than the original Ben Gurion route by cutting directly through Gaza. With modern means, the project would face far fewer setbacks than de Lessep’s 1869 endeavor and provide benefits at an improved pace.

Financial, Logistical, and Developmental Benefits

A U.S.-co-owned canal running through Gaza and southern Israel would provide several benefits.

First, it would provide an outlet for traffic buildup at the Suez Canal, which already takes an approximate 12-16 hours to traverse by convoy. This would lower maritime shipping times and operational costs. It would also alleviate the Suez Canal’s current monopolization of the maritime chokepoint and allow for competition to drive passage rates down from their current increased rate of $400,000-$700,000 per vessel. Both factors would provide for greater savings to be passed on to American consumers.

Furthermore, increased maritime traffic would bring greater investment to the Gulf of Aqaba, which Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia all border. For Saudi Arabia, this would improve the plausibility of economic diversification through tourist development along Red Sea towns. The same could be done in the remaining countries, or greater investment could promote the development of new towns for regionally displaced populations. Alongside organic investment from increased maritime traffic, passage fees would help to recoup costs incurred by the countries involved.

In 2023, total revenue for the Suez Canal was $9.4 billion. Even with increased pressure from Houthi attacks, the Canal still generated over $7 billion in 2024. With an American administration willing to take a more aggressive approach to secure the Red Sea, revenue would likely increase, and a portion of this total could redirect to the owners of the Gaza Canal.

Strategic Benefits

Perhaps the greatest benefit to the United States of a Gaza Canal would be the greater reliability of one of its most vital sea lines of communication (SLOC).

As demonstrated in the 2021 Ever Given crisis, the Suez Canal is vulnerable to closures, produced by mistake or malice. As the United States has effectively entered a new era of great power competition, it must consider the strategic costs of delayed logistics of both its naval assets and its merchant marine. The Chinese have already considered this vulnerability, prompting their dual-use development on the Panama Canal and the Trump administration’s recent efforts to mitigate this risk in the Western Hemisphere.

The Chinese have prepared for the future disruption of Western transit through Suez. Their only foreign military base is, very literally, down the street from the United States’ Red Sea base in Djibouti. Anticipating a future rerouting of maritime transit from Suez around the Cape of Good Hope, the Chinese have effectively consolidated unilateral influence over this alternative sea route, developing increased military relations and infrastructure development in South Africa, Comoros, Madagascar, Tanzania, and Namibia. These developments include naval exercises, military academies, and dual-use port infrastructure similar to their investments in Panama.

To mitigate this, the United States can either attempt to reverse decades of Chinese advances in southern Africa or shore up the security of its North African sea routes. A U.S.-controlled alternate option to the Suez Canal would serve the latter while a strategy to stem the tide of further Chinese expansion in Africa is developed and implemented.

Another strategic advantage to a joint venture between the United States, Israel, and bordering Arab states would be the furthering of symbiotic relationships between Israel and its neighbors. Such a venture would complement a renewed effort by the Trump Administration to further the Abraham Accords and stabilize the region. By creating more points of economic integration and codependence between Israel and Arab states, avenues toward sustained peace become more tangible and effective.

Although many of the details surrounding the United States’ role in Gaza remain undeveloped, a potential Gaza Canal should be an included consideration. As Gaza will need to be rebuilt from the ground up, the sad situation presents an ideal opportunity for the development of a large-scale project like the Canal as rubble and ordnance are removed and the future of Gaza begins to take shape.

By securing such a project, the United States would put America first by lowering costs on American consumers, help stabilize a region prone to drawing in unsustainable levels of American blood and treasure, and secure itself against the malicious acts of geopolitical competitors.

 Ashton Earl is the Director of Graduate Recruitment at Institute of World Politics.